Public forecast 008 · permanent record

Will Bank Rate be at or below 3.75% immediately after the November 2026 MPC announcement?

WITHDRAWN — kept on the record with its reason; withdrawals are never deleted.

Question
Will Bank Rate be at or below 3.75% immediately after the November 2026 MPC announcement?
Probability band
38–56% — issued 2026-08-14, data cut-off 2026-08-14
Frozen criterion
Resolves TRUE if, following the Monetary Policy Summary published on 5 November 2026, Bank Rate is 3.75% or lower. Resolves FALSE if Bank Rate is above 3.75%. If the announcement is postponed beyond 30 November 2026 the forecast is marked withdrawn with that reason.
Resolves by
2026-11-05
Model
judgement — reasoning recorded at issue, unchanged since
Ledger id
lxf_external_008
Supersedes
forecast 006 — corrections happen by supersession, never by edit
Why it was withdrawn
Issued 14 August 2026 and withdrawn the same day, before deployment. The due date was 2026-11-05T12:00:00Z. The Bank of England publishes the Monetary Policy Summary and minutes at 12 noon UK, and British Summer Time ends on 25 October 2026, so on 5 November 12:00 UK IS 12:00 UTC. The deadline was therefore the publication instant itself, with zero margin — the same defect that retired lxf_external_005, one hour short of biting instead of thirty minutes past it. Both came from setting a deadline off a UK wall-clock time without carrying the offset through. Superseded by lxf_external_010: same question, same band, same criterion, one hour of margin, and the publication instant now declared on the record so the gate can check it.
Reasoning recorded at issue — unchanged since, including where it turned out to be wrong: This replaces lxf_external_006, which said 88-96% on the reasoning that every indicator pointed away from tightening. That was a directional error, not a width error, and the correction is large enough to be worth stating plainly: from roughly 92% to roughly 47%. The question asks whether Bank Rate avoids a rise across TWO meetings, 17 September and 5 November, and three of nine Committee members were already voting to hike in July while the Committee judged inflation risks tilted to the upside. November also carries a Monetary Policy Report, and the MPC has historically been more inclined to move at meetings accompanied by a full forecast round. Two chances to move, with a third of the Committee already wanting to, puts this close to even. It is deliberately left below 50% rather than nudged above it: the honest reading of the July vote is that a rise by November is slightly more likely than not, and a forecast that flinches from its own evidence is worth nothing.
If ten forecasts were issued at this band, the band claims roughly 4 to 6 of them should come true. Calibration — not certainty — is what the register is scored on.
What would prove this system wrong: a forecast on this register edited after issue, a resolution scored against anything but the source named in advance, or an accuracy claim made before ten outcomes have resolved in a domain. Every one is checkable from the raw ledgerthe full falsification list.